The Judiciary and Public Choice by Cross, Frank B.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 50 | Issue 2 Article 3
1-1999
The Judiciary and Public Choice
Frank B. Cross
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355 (1999).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol50/iss2/3
Essay
The Judiciary and Public Choice
by
FRANK B. CROSS*
Public choice theory has assumed nearly preeminent importance
in legal analysis and often has been employed to justify an expansive
role for the judiciary and litigation in law interpretation. Concern
over the excessive influence of interest groups has focused upon
shortcomings of the legislative or administrative processes and has
often called upon judges to correct these failings. Yet the structural
shortcomings of litigation have been largely overlooked. My thesis is
that the judicial process is more susceptible to manipulation by
narrow interests than are the more democratic branches of
government and that expanding judicial review of those branches
would increase rather than decrease the influence of narrow special
interests on public policy.
I. Public Choice Analysis and the Law'
A broad theme of many public choice analyses is a preference for
the judiciary vis-A-vis other government institutions. This section
explores the basis of the pro-judiciary analysis. I also consider the
* Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law, Herbert D. Kelleher Professor
of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Public choice, for purposes of this article, involves interest group theory rather
than Arrovian randomness. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991) (discussing and distinguishing these two aspects of
public choice theory). Kenneth Arrow, among others, has demonstrated that majority
voting produces unstable results in the presence of more than two options. As different
sets of options are compared, results will cycle between options. See generally KENNETH
J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). While theoretically
troublesome, such cycling doesn't appear to occur much in practice. See William F.
Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv.
953, 956 (1998) (observing that "majority rule outcomes seem to be remarkably stable in
practice" and offering explanation).
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nature of the legal and political proposals that follow from this
preference. The proposals generally favor expanding the role of the
judiciary in checking the other institutions of government but apply
little scrutiny to the nature of the judicial process itself.
A. Institutions and Their Incentives
By public choice, I mean a concatenation of economic principles.
First, the theory assumes that all actors are motivated by self-interest.
Legislators, for example, are presumed interested in maximizing their
reelection prospects. Private entities are motivated by their financial
interests and will try to extract rents from the government whenever
possible.2 Second, public choice analysis commonly invokes Mancur
Olson's theory of collective choice.3 This widely accepted theory
suggests that smaller groups will be better able to organize
collectively and combine their resources, with less of a free rider
problem. For larger groups, each potential individual member has
less incentive to participate in the group, because the individual can
still benefit from the group's actions ("free ride") without
participating. For this reason, producers will be able to organize
better than consumers. Consequently, narrow groups such as
producers will commonly prevail before the legislature at the expense
of the broad but diffuse public interest.
Public choice thus suggests that the legislature will typically be in
thrall to narrow private interests, sometimes called factions. These
interests will attempt to purchase rents from the legislature.
Legislators will sell such rents in exchange for their own rents, in the
form of perquisites (e.g. golfing junkets), campaign contributions, and
other reelection advantages.4 Broader public interests will be unable
to counteract this influence because they will find it difficult to
organize effectively.5 Elections, the theory goes, will not counteract
2. A rent in this context refers to an economic benefit acquired by an entity through
its ability to escape the competitive pressure of markets, such as by establishing a
monopoly position, or by obtaining a direct transfer of wealth, rather than by creating
wealth. Rent-seeking research typically addresses the means by which special interest
groups attempt to manipulate the law in order to reduce competition or receive subsidies
from the government.
3. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971)
4. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (reporting that "legislation is
'sold' by the legislature and 'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation"); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 321, 344 (1990) (referring to the "deal between rent-seeking groups and
reelection-minded legislators").
5. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 19 (observing that "[t]here are few
lobbyists for consumers but many for producers").
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this influence.6 Interest group politics is biased in favor of narrow
economic interests. As a consequence, legislation will typically or
even always favor narrow interests at the expense of the general
public. 7
Public choice theory is similarly gloomy about the administrative
process. The executive-supervising president has the same incentives
as the legislatures. Individual bureaucrats need not worry about
reelection, but they have their own self-interests. One such interest is
lucrative future employment.8 As a consequence, narrow collective
interests will also influence the administrative agencies. This is
sometimes referred to as "regulatory capture."
Federal judges are not so obviously influenced by narrow
collectivities. These judges are given life tenure and hence need not
worry about reelection.9 Nor do such judges typically leave the bench
for more lucrative employment. The maximand of federal judges
remains quite uncertain. 10 While the nature of judges' self-interests is
not fully understood, judges do seem to be less susceptible than
legislators and bureaucrats to collective interests seeking rents at the
expense of the general welfare." This intuition has led to a relative
6. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L. 491, 498 n.38 (1997) (observing that according to public choice theorists,
"legislators generally respond not to the will of a majority of their constituents but rather
to well-organized special interest groups which offer campaign contributions in exchange
for favorable votes on legislation"); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the
Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory,
74 VA. L. REV. 471, 490 (1988) (contending that "[p]olitical parties, recognizing the
phenomenon of voter apathy due to rational ignorance, compete for the right to divert
resources from the general population to those interest groups most adept at overcoming
the free rider problem").
7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword." The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984) (suggesting that "many laws are designed to serve private
rather than public interests").
8. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). This seminal article suggests that administrators look to
the possibility of post-government employment as well as maximizing their budgets and
their powers. These objectives may work at cross-purposes, however. Actions taken to
maximize agency budgets and power will often be pro-regulatory and contrary to the
interests of the regulated entities (at least in the case of social regulation).
9. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 886-887 (observing that life tenure
largely divorces judicial rewards from the outcome of judicial decisions).
10. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 294-303 (1997)
(generally reviewing inconclusivity of research); Shugart & Tollison, supra note 1, at 959-
60 (discussing theories of judicial motivation).
11. See William C. Mitchell & Randy T. Simmons, Public Choice and the Judiciary:
Introductory Notes, 1990 BYU L. REV. 729, 741 (1990) (reporting that "the judiciary is
commonly thought to be so organized that public choice principles are not applicable").
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preference for judicial decision-making. 12
B. Preference for the Judiciary and Litigation
Law and economics has had a longstanding preference for
litigation over legislation. Some have argued that the common law
was efficient, in contrast to the relatively inefficient public law created
by legislatures.13 The implicit prescription was for more law to be
made by judges and less by legislatures. Others have argued that the
judiciary should aggressively review legislation, striking it down or
modifying its prescriptions toward the end of the common good.14
The public choice theorists generally call for more active judicial
involvement in lawmaking, at the expense of the legislative and
executive branches of government.15 Edward Rubin has observed
12. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (observing that public
choice theory of legislation is often accepted, though "few legal scholars will countenance
this approach where judges are concerned").
13. See, e.g., DONALD WrrTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 116 (1995)
(noting that the "main thrust of the literature in economic analysis of the law is that judge-
made law is efficient, while legislative regulation is woefully inept and subject to rent-
seeking").
14. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 63 (observing that the "most dramatic
proposals to apply public choice" have been to use constitutional law to limit economic
legislation and regulation); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreward: The Vanishing Consitution 103
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (calling for less deferential constitutional review of political
decisions); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Commerce Clause, 51 U.
CHI. L. REv. 703 (1984) (advocating enhanced judicial review of rent-seeking legislation);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 92 (1988) (observing that interest group theorists would probably adopt an
"interventionist judicial strategy" of the constitution); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980) (arguing generally for aggressive judicial
review of economic legislation); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes
Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court invalidate special interest legislation); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and
the Power of the Purse, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 191 (1992) (calling for expanded
judicial review of the appropriation process).
15. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-
Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 661-62 (1997) (describing tendency
of public choice scholars to prefer judicial action); Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic
Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71
TEx. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (1993) (noting that public choice provides "a rationale for
remedying alleged deficiencies of electoral and legislative politics through judicial
intervention"); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrustive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 33 (1991) (listing numerous prominent legal scholars
contending that public choice theory "justifies changing judicial review to make it less
deferential to political outcomes"); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 908 (1987) (noting that public choice
commentators "have advocated more stringent judicial review"); Jonathan Macey,
Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1987)
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that public choice scholars, like legal scholars in general, conclude
that whatever the issue, "the best people to resolve it are judges.' 6
While not every public choice devotee is utterly enamored with
judicial review, this is the clear tendency of the writings.
Administrative law lies at the intersection of the three branches
and has been the primary recent focus of public choice theorists.
Their central argument has been for greater judicial activism in
review of administrative action. Prominent scholars, such as Cass
Sunstein have called for more intrusive judicial review of agency
rulemaking, to combat public choice problems such as agency
capture.' 7 Yet it is in administrative law that I believe the public
choice case against judicial review is strongest. I will focus upon this
area of the law throughout the article.
The public choice preference for the judiciary and litigation is
not universally embraced. Some, including Landes and Posner, have
questioned the effectiveness of judges in combating inappropriate
legislative action.18  Others, such as Farber and Frickey, have
(contending generally that an independent federal judiciary is an obstacle to rent-seeking
behavior of interest groups); Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses
and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REv. 827, 850-51 (contending that
judicial independence enables courts to strike down interest group deals); GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that the
structure of courts makes them better suited to resolve policy issues fairly); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 952 (addressing view
that "[c]ourts, where the intellectual class dominates, constrain the rent-seeking of
government classes"); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial
Activism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1997) (suggesting that in some
circumstances courts neutralize the dynamics of interest group influence); Courtney
Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative
Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 119 (1995) (reporting that legal scholars "call on the
judiciary to realign the perceived unrepresentative, undemocratic, or even corrupt
interest-group influence and political dealmaking").
16. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657,
1670 (1993). See also Skeel, supra note 15, at 662 (observing that "the proposals tend to
assume that judges are somehow above the fray and can be wholly objective in
interpreting the statutes that come before them").
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 61-63 (1985) (suggesting that hard look judicial review can flush out impermissible
rent-seeking bases for regulation). See also Marc Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals To Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 502 (1997) (arguing that limiting judicial review would
"benefit groups with narrow interests"); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE LJ. 387 (1987) (arguing that judicial
review protects public interest against agency capture); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated
Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80
GEO. L.J. 671 (1992) (contending that judicial review prevents agencies from favoring
special interests).
18. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4 (indicating that incentive of independent
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suggested that judges may be unable to distinguish between
illegitimate government action and public-regarding legislation. 9 Yet
others have invoked normative or formalist critiques, arguing that our
Constitution precludes a more active judicial role.20
Scholars have not generally considered the possibility that
litigation could be more susceptible to inappropriate rent-seeking
influences than are the legislature and executive.21 I contend that
more active judicial review of administrative action, for example, will
exacerbate the problems of government favoring narrow special
interests. This derives not from the preferences or incentives of
judges but from the essential structure of the litigation process itself.
I explain in the following section.
H. Public Choice and Litigation
The focus on decisionmaker incentives makes courts look
appealing from a public choice perspective but ignores the structural
effects of institutional arrangements. Courts are simply another
venue in which influence may be brought to bear upon government
policy. The lobbying of courts can take a variety of forms, including
test cases and forum shopping, amicus curiae participation, provision
of expert witnesses, selective settlement, and other techniques. This
section reviews three distinct reasons why special interests find a
favorable audience in the judiciary.
A. Resources
The theory of public choice and the legislature describes the
"purchase" of legal benefits by special interests best able to pay for
such benefits, such as by campaign contributions to elected officials.
This same principle obviously calls for consideration of resource costs
judiciary is to enforce special interest bargains of past legislatures).
19. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 64; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note
15, at 908-09 (questioning whether the judiciary can accurately identify and cure interest
group influence).
20. See Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695; James M. Buchanan, Good Economics - Bad Law,
60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974).
21. The influence of group lobbying in courts was recognized long ago. See generally
DAviD TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). There are some more recent
criticisms of the judiciary that should be recognized. For example, the problem of
precedent-purchasing (discussed below in section II) has been noted in Peter H.
Aranson, Models of Judicial Choice as Allocation and Distribution in Constitutional Law,
1990 BYU L. REV. 745 (1990). The same issue is also addressed in Elhauge, supra note
15, at 68-71. The latter article offers a rare example of comparative institutional analysis
from the public choice perspective. Such pieces are relatively few, however, and are
typically ignored by the pro-judiciary theorists.
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of litigation. While judicial filing fees are relatively low, litigation
calls for many additional costs. Lawyer time is expensive and the best
lawyers are the most expensive. These costs can best be borne by
special interest groups The typical plaintiff in an administrative law
challenge, for example, is an organization; the incentives of an
individual to bear litigation costs are small due to the free rider
problem.22 Organizations sponsor litigation "because individuals lack
the necessary time, money, and skill." 23 Litigation therefore suffers
the same Olsonian 4 special interest problems as political action, and
special interests may use litigation to enhance their market power or
frustrate public-interested regulation.
Once in court, those organizations with greater resources are
more successful. Experience and litigation expertise contributes to
success in court.25 Marc Galanter has explained how the "basic
architecture" of the litigation process enables wealthier participants
to prevail frequently.26 In the contested area of administrative law,
"the power is held by interest groups and others who can afford the
lawyers to play the process and go to the courts." 27 McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast observe that "industries, with greater economic stakes
in regulatory issues, are more likely to devote the resources necessary
to be effectively represented in expensive proceedings." 28  The
existing public interest groups, as Mancur Olson predicts, tend to be
poorer than special interest groups. In consequence, they become
"exhausted [by] the litigation process" and unable to "mobilize the
resources to capitalize on the fruits of legal victories. '29 Litigation
over government policies, such as regulation, typically requires great
expense and considerable expertise.30 While it was once thought that
22. See Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts, 70
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 723,735 (1976).
23. Clement E. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS
20,22 (1958).
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced
Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (1995).
26. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95, 95 (1974).
27. Philip K. Howard, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of Responsibility, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 312,318 (1996).
28. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
469 (1989).
29. Joel B. Grossman & Austin Sarat, Access to Justice and the Limits of Law, in
GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 88 (Richard A.L. Gambitta, Marlynn L. May & James
C. Foster eds., 1981).
30. See Susan M. Olson, Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond the
Political Disadvantage Theory, 52 J. POL. 854,859 (1990).
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disadvantaged groups could successfully turn to the courts to protect
their interests, this was an artifact of early case studies on the civil
rights movements. More recent analyses have shown that politically
advantaged groups are better able to take advantage of the litigation
process.31 Many such groups can synergistically use their influence in
the political branches in combination with a judicial strategy in order
to maximize their prospects. 3z
Data demonstrate that richer interest groups are more successful
in court.33 A review of United States Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions found that "upperdogs" or "haves" are far more successful
than individuals or small businesses 4 Throughout the court system,
big business wins an overwhelming proportion of its cases, whether as
plaintiff or defendant.35 A recent close study of the development of
doctrine in the federal law of public nuisance found that significant
factors in predicting decisions included the party's resources, the
attorney's experience, and the presence of amicus support.3 6 In
addition to financial resources, special interest groups may succeed in
court in part because of their general political clout.37 Such groups
have not been shy about using the courts to advance their agenda.38
Thomas Merrill recognizes the resource benefits enjoyed by
31. Id. at 854-856. See generally, Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial
Politics and Legal Change, 59 J. POL. 778, 783 (1997) (reporting that litigants with
financial resources "are much more successful in appellate courts than less resourceful
litigants" and thereby "gain legal rules that will give them substantial leverage in
subsequent encounters").
32. See Olson, supra note 30, at 859-81.
33. See Kevin T. McGuire, Capital Investments in the U.S. Supreme Court: Winning
with Washington Representation, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 72, 81 (Lee Epstein ed.
1995) (reporting empirical advantages for organizational litigants before the Court);
HERBERT JACOB, LAW AND POLIrIcs IN THE UNITED STATES 154-55 (2nd ed. 1995)
(observing that interest groups have more success getting the U.S. Supreme Court to take
certiorari in a case and in winning those cases that are taken).
34. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and
Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 235 (1992).
35. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation
in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991,21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 497 (1996).
36. Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Development of a Legal Rule, 23 L. & SOC'Y. REV. 613,632
(1998).
37. See Barbara M. Yarnold, Do Courts Respond to the Political Clout of Groups or to
Their Superior Litigation Resources/"Repeat Player" Status, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 29 (1995)
(studying district court opinions on abortion and finding significant association between
success in court and political involvement).
38. See generally Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman's "Folklore," 16 L. & SOC'Y REv. 311,
314 (1981-82) (reviewing social science studies and reporting that "[v]irtually all recent
research, therefore, has found evidence of a significant systematic organizational role in
Supreme Court litigation").
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special interest litigants but nevertheless favors the judicial role.39
This more nuanced justification of courts suggests that the minimally
necessary costs of litigation are less than the costs of lobbying and
that the marginal benefit of additional litigation expenditures is
rather small.4° As a consequence, he believes that the judiciary opens
up the government to more interest groups and may enable groups
with fewer resources to prevail. 41
Merrill's attention to the legislative branch focuses exclusively
upon the costs of a lobbying campaign. The costs of lobbying
Congress may be well beyond the capacity of the average individual
or small group, and effective lobbying may exceed the resources of
broad-based public interest groups. The average individual citizen
does have an inexpensive way to influence legislators, though, by
voting. Evidence discussed in section III.A below indicates that
voting may be an effective tool for influencing representatives. Even
nonelectoral expressions of public opinion may influence
representatives, including the president, who attend to polling results.
However, the average citizen has no comparable tool for influencing
the decisions of federal judges. On this score, the representative
branches are structurally more responsive to the general welfare.
Merrill's theory suffers other shortcomings as well. When
evaluating the benefit of litigation resources, he considers only their
value for winning the instant case. He does not consider the ability of
richer groups to bring more cases more strategically, thereby
overextending public interest groups.42 More seriously, he does not
consider the ability of richer groups to use their resources to settle
cases selectively in order to direct the path of the law.43 His focus is
on constitutional litigation, and he does not compare the relative
resource demands of the judiciary and the agencies, which is crucial to
the administrative law analysis on which I focus.
B. Standing
Under the Constitution, any citizen may petition the government
39. See Merrill, supra note 15, at 222.
40. Merrill suggests that the minimally necessary costs of litigation are around
$250,000, id. at 222, and that the minimally necessary costs of lobbying are around $2
million. It at 224. He then contends that the direct benefits of litigation expenditure
become inelastic at a sum around $1.5 million. I& at 227. While none of these numbers
are empirically supported, they seem plausible.
41. See i at 226 (contending that "[j]udicial activism therefore adds spice to the
political system").
42. See JACOB, supra note 33, at 149 (noting that interest groups "develop a stream of
litigation over many years" as part of a "broader strategy of action" and "carefully select
their clients to provide the best chance of obtaining a favorable ruling").
43. See infra Section II.C on precedent-purchasing.
January 1999] THE JUDICIARY AND PUBLIC CHOICE
for redress of grievances. The circumstances permitting petition of
the courts, however, are more restrictive. A plaintiff must have
standing in order to invoke judicial action. The doctrine of standing
and the closely related case or controversy requirement for
adjudication serve directly to promote narrow special interests over
the general public interest. Due to standing doctrine, individual
industries may be represented in court, but "the societal interest in an
innovative and competitive economy is often not effectively
represented." 44
Supreme Court standing doctrine explicitly favors special
interests seeking rents at the expense of the broad general public.
The Court has consistently granted standing to groups seeking to
invoke the law in order to prevent competition. Travel agencies have
standing to sue to keep banks from operating competing travel
agency services.45 An investment company trade association has
standing to challenge competition from banks.46 Securities dealers
have standing to fight bank competition.47 Banks have standing to
limit competition from credit unions 8 In all these cases, a narrow
special interest invoked the judicial process to insulate itself from full
free market competition. The general interest of consumers, by
contrast, typically does not generate standing to sue. According to
longstanding doctrine, standing requires a particular injury, "as
distinguished from the public's interest in the administration of the
law."4 9
The adverse consequences of standing doctrine are well
illustrated by Block v. Community Nutrition Institute.50 In that action,
a group representing consumers nationwide sought to challenge an
agricultural marketing order that limited dairy production and
thereby increased price. The Court held that the public interest
representatives lacked standing, though there is little doubt that the
regulated targets of the order would have had standing. The Court
has frankly declared that there is no standing to represent interests
"pervasively shared" by members of the public.51 Standing, almost by
definition, offers a forum for narrow special interests and closes the
44. Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in
Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 655,681 (1985).
45. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
46. See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
47. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n., 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
48. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., _ U.S.
118 S. Ct. 927 (1999).
49. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 125,125 (1940).
50. 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
51. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
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door to appeals by the diffuse public interest.5 2
Standing doctrine has been liberalized somewhat, but it remains
biased against the diffuse public interest. The liberalization has itself
created new opportunities for special interest manipulation of the
law. The Supreme Court created a "zone of interests" test that
enables certain parties to challenge statutory interpretation,
apparently broadening the group of those who have standing.53 In
determining who falls within this zone of interests of the statute,
providing standing, courts typically reference the legislative history of
the statute. This provides special interests with an inexpensive
opportunity to use the legislative process (even individual legislators)
in order to slip within the zone of interests, thereby opening up the
courts to those who can more effectively play the legislative game 54
Countervailing interests may be excluded from the zone. A study of
district court litigation found that interest groups used their political
and legal resources complementarily in order to gain influence. 55
Rather than combating special interest influence in the legislative
process, judicial review may thus enhance such influence.
Maxwell Steams has argued that standing doctrine helps save
judicial decisions from the cycling problems associated with social
choice theory.56 Yet this rescue condemns judicial decision-making to
suffer the influence of narrow interest groups and deny a forum to
broad public interests. At best, judges could "do no harm" by voting
against such narrow interests that possess standing. Yet as the
preceding section shows, judges more often rule in favor of the
interests.
In contrast to judicial standing doctrine, anyone may petition the
elected branches of government. Groups of taxpayers, for example,
who could not get in the door of the federal courts, have had at least
occasional success in petitioning Congress for tax relief.57
52. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (declaring
that targets of regulation presumptively have standing but that "much more" is needed to
establish standing for "someone else").
53. The seminal cases establishing the zone of interests test are Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 (1970).
54. See Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts, 70
AM. POL. SCd. REV. 723, 732-33 (1976) (suggesting that the new test opens options to
interest groups that "seem to be limited only by the imaginative and financial resources of
the groups themselves").
55. See Shughart & Tollison, supra note 1, at 877.
56. See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability:
and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995).
57. Taxpayers generally lack standing to sue over federal expenditures. See United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 155 (1974); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
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Legislatures can set their own agendas and can choose to do nothing.
In contrast, courts' agendas are set by parties, and decisions generally
must be rendered. 58 Standing doctrine grants special access to special




Law and economics scholars have increasingly come to recognize
the power of litigants over the path of the law. Courts cannot
affirmatively issue advisory opinions regarding the state of the law.
Judges must instead take those cases that come before them.
Litigants control which cases reach the courts, a control that can be
used to manipulate the path of the law. Should a defendant fear a
court's decision, that defendant can evade such a decision by settling
the case, often for a sum of money. The special interests, of course,
possess both the resources and the incentive to settle cases selectively
in this fashion.
The recently settled case of Piscataway Township Board v.
Taxman illustrates the ability to manipulate courts through
settlement.6° When civil rights groups feared that the case might set a
broad precedent against affirmative action, they arranged a
settlement with the white teacher plaintiff. Thus, a non-party
interested group intervened to remove the case from the Court and
avoid a feared precedent. 61 Expert repeat players with resources can
most effectively exercise this law manipulation. 62
A party can strategically avoid an undesirable judicial ruling
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). There may be a narrow exception when the
challenge is under the Establishment Clause. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
58. See JACOB, supra note 33, at 150 (reporting that "interest groups that bring such
cases find themselves in a uniquely influential position because they can bend the agenda
of the court to their own purposes in a way they could rarely affect the agendas of
legislatures or administrative agencies").
59. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS 15 (1983).
60. See Taxman v. Board of Education of Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd
Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub. nom., Piscataway Township Bd. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1116
(1997).
61. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Avoidance, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997,
at C1 (discussing the strategic settlement of Taxman).
62. The settlement funds in Taxman actually came from large corporations, raising
the suggestion that the settlement preserving affirmative action may have been intended
to preserve a competitive edge for large companies over small competitors, who have
higher relative costs of compliance with affirmative action commands. See James K.
Glassman, Buying Off Justice, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1997, at A19 (noting that big
companies can better absorb the costs of affirmative action than smaller firms).
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through settlement.63 A favorable ruling may be created simply by
screening out the unfavorable fact patterns. Acting as a plaintiff, a
party may shop for the most favorable forum and favorable judge or
panel of judges before proceeding with its claim. As a defendant, a
party may settle all challenges save for the case that presents the most
favorable fact pattern and weakest adversaries. Driving the relatively
promising case to litigation may functionally enable the defendant to
select a forum to create a favorable precedent. Or a party may simply
keep relitigating the matter until clear favorable precedents were
obtained.64 Parties have also used vacatur or "depublishing" of
opinions to protect themselves from those precedents that proved
unexpectedly adverse.65
Selective litigation has been invoked as a basis for the law's
efficiency, as the party with the greatest stake in the matter will be
best able to settle selectively and purchase precedent. This theory
rests on a highly unrealistic assumption of equal stakes and resources,
however. To effectively purchase precedent, a party must have the
resources to selectively settle and the ability to capture the benefits of
a favorable precedent. These features are characteristic of narrow
special interests, rather than the general interest.66
A recent doctoral dissertation analytically and empirically
reveals how telecommunications companies use administrative law
litigation for "protecting profitable markets, raising rivals' costs, and
affecting market entry patterns." 67  It demonstrates how litigation
information and expertise, acquired at some cost, is invaluable in
selecting and prosecuting successful cases. The empirical analysis of
challenges to the Federal Communications Commission demonstrates
a pronounced effect of both resources and litigation experience on
success in court.68
Purchasing judicial precedent analogizes to the theory of
purchasing legislation. While litigants may be unable to purchase the
judge's favors directly, they can achieve the same end indirectly, by
63. See Elhauge, supra note 15, at 78 (observing that parties will "settle strategically in
cases where the type of judge or set of facts seems likely to lead to unfavorable
precedent"). Elhauge notes that this process favors special interests because large, diffuse
groups that share a common interest may be unable to "collect the funds necessary to pay
off litigants bringing worrisome cases." Id at 79. Large diffuse groups may be at an even
greater disadvantage in monitoring outstanding litigation that threatens the group interest.
64. See Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 205, 212
(1982).
65. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 665 (1994).
66. This point is effectively made in Elhauge, supra note 15.
67. John de Figueiredo, The Politics of the Court and the Strategy of the Firm (1997)
unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, on file with author.
68. See id. at 115-17.
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dictating the cases that go to a judicial decision. Precedent
purchasing may be considered more adverse to the public interest
than legislation purchasing. There is no countervailing power of
public opinion or public vote in the courts. There may be no
countervailing power of ideology - factions must take Congress and
the President as they find them but may strategically choose to litigate
in front of a favorably ideological panel of the appellate courts, at
least for those cases that do not reach the Supreme Court. The media
monitors litigation less thoroughly than it does the legislature and
presidency, thus protecting deals from public whistleblowing. Buying
off a plaintiff is generally cheaper than buying off the essential
members of a legislature. Perhaps most critically, a settlement
agreement buying off a plaintiff can be essentially unambiguous and
legally enforceable, while a clear contract with a legislator would be
an illegal and unenforceable bribe.69
II. Comparative Institutional Analysis
In the above section, I have sought to provide persuasive
theoretical reasons why the judiciary is susceptible to the influence of
narrow special interests. Any policy prescriptions, however, should
be based upon a comparative institutional analysis of legislatures and
the judiciary, and should consider empirical evidence.70 Conducting a
rigorous empirical comparative institutional analysis is problematic,
however, due to the imprecision of the analogies between the
participants in the legislative and judicial institutions. Bearing this
difficulty in mind, I discuss in this section some additional
comparative theoretical considerations as well as some anecdotal
evidence indicating that the judiciary is inferior to the democratic
branches from a public choice perspective.
A. Limits of the Public Choice Model and Comparative Institutions
In the extreme version of public choice modeling, all government
action is inefficient and unwise. Under this vision, judicial review
could hardly make the problem worse. Yet this vision is too narrow -
public choice can be an effective explanation of legislative and
administrative action but is surely not a complete explanation of such
action. Ample evidence demonstrates that narrow self-interest does
69. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 72
(1990) (noting that special interest deals with legislators do not approach status as binding
contract).
70. See Elhauge, supra note 15, at 67 (suggesting comparative analysis is required,
though "[t]hose advocating more intrusive judicial review rarely address this comparative
question").
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not utterly rule the legislative and administrative processes.
While public choice theory certainly explains some legislative
and executive actions, the theory is incomplete and ignores
countervailing interests, such as the more diffuse but nevertheless
extant organizations of public interest, the ideological objectives of
politicians (especially those with job security), accountability to the
general public in elections, and the influence of the media.71 These
factors may counteract illegitimate pressures from special interests. 2
If the legislator's goal is re-election as presumed, she should be
responsive to the vast bulk of voters. Campaign contributions surely
help win re-election, but so do popular policies. The vote can
counteract interest group pressures, and the factions realize this
effect. It has been observed that "[o]rganized groups often do little to
oppose legislation that is potentially adverse to their interests,
especially when public opinion strongly favors the legislation."7 3
Daniel Shaviro has shown how and why special interests could not
derail tax reform legislation. 4  Political scientists have found a
significant association between general public opinion and
government policy in a variety of areas.75
Legislation is also influenced by the legislators' concept of good
policy. It should not be too shocking to suggest that elected officials
are interested in power as well as money. Ample evidence indicates
that ideology is a good predictor of congressional voting.76 For
example, a recent study of educational finance reform found decisions
explained more by ideology and media influence than by special
71. See Shaviro, supra note 69 (describing limits of public choice theory as applied to
tax reform legislation).
72. See JACOB, supra note 33, at 145 (noting that "[g]roups may be effective in gaining
access and yet fail to convince lawmakers to adopt their suggestions, for legislators must
face the electorate, which may defeat them if they case unpopular votes").
73. Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV.
191, 197 (1988). Lee uses the example of environmental legislation. He then suggests that
interest groups may accept the legislation due to their confidence in their ability to subvert
the implementation of the law at the administrative level. See id Yet the frequency of
interest group judicial challenges to environmental regulation demonstrates that this
ability to subvert implementation is not so strong as he implies.
74. See Shaviro, supra note 69.
75. See, e.g., Robert S. Erikson, et al., Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State
Policy in the United States, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 729 (1989); Benjamin I. Page & Robert
Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, AM. J. POL. SC. 175 (1983); Gerald
Kramer, Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964, 65 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 131 (1981); Amihai Glazer & Marc Robbins, Congressional Responsiveness to
Constituency Change, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 260 (1985).
76. For a recent review article on the impact of ideology on congressional voting, see
Bruce Bender & John R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the
Literature, 87 PUB. CHOICE 67 (1996).
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interest lobbying.77 Empirical data also suggests that bureaucratic
action is heavily influenced by ideology. 78 Judge Posner observes that
today's regulation is characterized by "diffuse benefits and
concentrated costs... and so cannot easily be assimilated to a model
of regulation that is based on cartel and interest-group theory. '79
The theoretical simplicity of public choice models does not
translate directly into reality. Empirical evidence demonstrates that
ideology and voter power overcomes special interest pressure.8° In a
vote on fast track trade negotiation power extension, for example,
there was considerable interest group pressure, but voting patterns
were explained well by ideology, party loyalty, and constituent
interest.81 Other research indicates that interest groups have only a
slight marginal influence on congressional voting.82
Moreover, even legislative special interest favors may sometimes
go hand in hand with the public interest. The legislature may create
public interest programs in order to obtain a hook to facilitate special
interest bargains. The interstate highway program, surely in the
general interest, enables legislators to finance individual projects that
may benefit narrow interests. Likewise, a water pollution control act
may enable similar local special interest programs while
simultaneously advancing the public interest in clean water. Even
though the particular special interest benefits may be unworthy, the
overall program providing public goods may well be net beneficial.83
The need for Congress to legislate generally on behalf of narrow
interests is further obviated by the availability of "milkers" - threats
77. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory
and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179,189-202 (1996).
78. See, e.g., William Gormley, A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC,
23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 665 (1979) (finding that Commissioners' political party affiliation was
best predictor of voting).
79. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 953,957-58 (1997).
80. In addition to the sources cited above, see those cited in Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CmI. L. REy. 63, 88-89 (1990). See also
Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 214 (1988);
Rubin, supra note 12, at 22.
81. See Leo H. Kahane, Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fast-Track
Trade Procedure: Prelude to NAFTA, 87 PuB. CHoICE 35 (1996). See also Dennis Coates
& Michael Munger, Legislative Voting and the Economic Theory of Politics, 61 Soc.
ECON. J. 861 (1995) (reporting empirical demonstration of limits to special interest
influence in strip mining legislation).
82. See John Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational
Perspective, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 400 (1985); WrIrMAN, supra note 13, at 80-5
(summarizing research).
83. See Tyler Cowen, et al., Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision of Public Goods,
6 ECON. & POL. 131 (1994).
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to take action against such interests.84 By making such threats, the
legislature can raise considerable resources from interest groups in
exchange for not taking action. Congresspersons can obtain their
rents simply by doing nothing on some subset of potential legislation.
Given the monopoly position of the legislature, its members should
be able to raise substantial revenues from the interest groups and still
be able to both take action on behalf of constituents and their visions
of the general public interest.
Nor is executive action so frequently the product of interest
group pressures. The once popular theory of agency capture is no
longer persuasive.8 5 Agencies commonly frustrate special interest
factions, as demonstrated by the direct costs of regulation and the
many court challenges such factions file against agency action.
Increased presidential oversight also reduces the powers of interest
groups in the executive branch.86 Presidential oversight may be able
to counter legislative special interest favors far more effectively than
can the courts. If one supposes that the original legislative enactment
was a special interest bargain, "federal judges are far more likely to
enforce original legislative deals than agencies controlled by the
President are." 7 Judicial review would, therefore, protect narrow
special interests from public-regarding executive action.
The evidence is mounting that government, despite its
imperfections and bows to special interests, works reasonable well in
the public interest. Hovenkamp notes that "[t]here is no obvious
reason for thinking that political markets work more poorly than
economic markets; in fact, there are many reasons for thinking that
84. See Fred S. McChesney, Purchasing Political Inaction: How Regulators Use the
Threat of Legal "Reform" to Extort Payoffs, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 211 (1997); Fred
S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); Shaviro, supra note 69, at 71.
85. See Macey, supra note 6, at 513 (reporting that "interest group capture of
administrative agencies... is unusual"); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism:
Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435,436 (1991) (observing
that "capture has not seemed to be theoretically or empirically fertile to many sociologists
and political scientists working in the regulation literature"); K. SCHLOZMAN & J.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 344 (1986) (reporting
that "[c]apture is not by any means the norm, and where capture occurs, it does not always
last").
86. See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 213, 237 (1990) (indicating that the President is primarily interested in
"effective governance" and will focus upon "social problems and interests and resist
specialized appeals"); James C. Miller et al., A Note on Centralized Regulatory Review, 43
PUB. CHOICE 83, 86 (1984) (suggesting that centralization of review in the presidency
empowers more diffuse interests); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Contro; and the
Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modem Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J.
1180, 1193 (1994) (arguing that the President is less vulnerable to special interest appeals).
87. Posner, supra note 79, at 960.
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they should work better."88  Wittman contends that democratic
"markets" work about as well as economic free markets.89 The
presence of imperfections is undeniable but should not cause us to
ignore the successful functioning of democratic government.
Some more conservative public choice advocates might suggest
that all government action is illegitimate rent-seeking. If so,
government action would be per se bad, and activist judicial review
that restricted government action would be presumptively good. But
it is clear that not all government action is so illegitimate, and the
theory of public choice indicates that special interests devote
considerable resources to fighting beneficial government action.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that special interests are at their
most influential when it comes to blocking beneficial government
action (rather than creating undesirable government action).90 If this
is so, much government action is desirable, and public choice theory
implies that we have too little of it. Under these circumstances,
activist judicial review that restricts government action is
counterproductive.
Judicial review functionally gives the factions another bite at the
apple, a backstop enabling them to frustrate the public good, even
after their efforts have failed at the legislative and executive levels. 91
88. Hovenkamp, supra note 80, at 100.
89. See generally WrrrMAN, supra note 13. Other economists have made much this
same point. See, e.g., Peter J. Coughlin, Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with
Probabilistic Voting, 39 PUB. CHOIcE 427 (1982) (demonstrating how even imperfectly
informed voters can produce efficient policies); Stephen Anthony Baba, Democracies and
Inefficiency, 9 ECON. & POL. 99 (1997) (demonstrating how democratic structures will
sometimes produce efficient outcomes, rather than bowing to special interest pressure);
Amihai Glazer, The Electoral Costs of Special Interest Politics When Voters Are Ignorant, 1
ECON. & POL. 225 (1989) (demonstrating how even uninformed voters will yield efficient
policies).
90. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 85, at 395-98 (reviewing evidence on
influence of organized interest and concluding that such factions are more effective at
blocking legislation than at procuring legislation); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint
and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2218 (1996) (noting that the result of special interest collective
action is often "not that bad regulation becomes law, but rather that good regulation fails
to become law"); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 32 (1997)
(explaining that "because in our checked and balanced government an interest group
needs to control only one institution (the House, the Senate or the presidency) to block
legislation or to derail implementation in the bureaucracy or the courts, it seems quite
reasonable to predict that even more public interest legislation may be blocked than
private interest legislation is passed"). See also Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics
and Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 199 (1991)
(reporting observation that much legislation involves redistribution from the politically
powerful to the powerless).
91. See Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985
DUKE L.J. 427, 450 (1985) (observing that judicial review enables "those special interests
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Consider the recent decision in National Credit Union Administration
v. First National Bank & Trust Co. 92 The 1934 passage of the Federal
Credit Union Act may have involved a special interest deal to protect
banks from credit union competition, but the language was
sufficiently ambiguous that the executive National Credit Union
Administration could interpret the law in order to enable relatively
broad credit union competition. A conventional bank that sought to
limit competition from credit unions challenged this interpretation.
The Supreme Court ruled for the banks, precluding small unrelated
employee groups from forming credit unions. In the process, the
Court handed a major competitive advantage to large employers,
disadvantaging smaller companies. 93 This is a classic special interest
victory made possible by judicial review.94
The judiciary, susceptible to narrow collective interests for the
reasons set forth above, lacks some of the key countervailing factors
that exist in legislative and executive decisions, most critically the
electoral accountability.95 Other features of the judicial process also
favor special interest influence. Schlozman and Tierney found that
interest groups were most effective when attempting to block rather
than create action, when the issues had relatively low visibility, and
when the group is able to select a favorable forum.96 These three
features characterize most judicial action.97
Jerry Mashaw provides yet another reason why the judicial
process is particularly susceptible to special interest litigation.
Typical factions have some concern about their own public image -
they may depend on the public as consumers or for contributions.
Special interest appeals to the legislature or agencies may "appear to
with the capacity to use the courts to achieve judicially what they could not obtain
politically").
92. See 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
93. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ad Hoc Small Employers Group et aL (May 12,
1997) (explaining how decision hurts small employers' ability to form credit unions which
in turn hurts their ability to compete for employees).
94. I suppose that some might argue that it is the credit unions that are the special
interest group, rather than the banks. In this case, however, the public interest appears to
lie on the side of the credit unions. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Consumer Federation
of America and U.S. Public Interest Research Group (May 12, 1997) (describing how
decision undermines price competition for bank customers).
95. Cf Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-
Making, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941, 969 (1995) (observing that the features of the judicial system
"do not provide positive inducements to behave in a desirable manner, particularly with
respect to the enhancement of social welfare").
96. See also SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 85, at 395-97.
97. Courts are well-suited to blocking action, through vacation and injunction, are
relatively lower in media visibility than the Congress or the President, and provide a wider
variety of forum choices for special interests.
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be (or be portrayed by their opponents or the press to be) seeking
quasicorrupt political favors. ' 98 Fear of this appearance may deter
some appeals to the elected branches, thereby limiting special interest
influence. Pursuing a court action, by contrast, is portrayed as a
vindication of some abstract legal right, often a procedural one. This
is a safer posture for the factions, as the public may not begrudge
even a special interest's efforts to vindicate its "legal rights." Tobacco
companies could not publicly favor underage smoking, but they could
file suit against a particular government policy aimed at reducing
underage smoking. Judicial review thus offers an alternative avenue
for special interests when direct political action is not politically
feasible.
B. Comparative Advantages of the Elected Branches
I am unsure how to design a rigorous empirical study to test the
relative influence of factions on the various branches of government.
Considerable experiential evidence, though, suggests that judicial
review may aggravate the public choice problem. In this section, I
briefly review such experience in brief case studies of environmental
law, deregulation, and legislative procedural reform. I also consider
additional experiential tests of the comparative institutional
characteristics of the judiciary and the elected branches of
government.
(1) Environmental Law
Environmental issues are among the most litigated in
administrative law. The very existence of environmental law, which
has public benefits and concentrated costs on discrete groups, is
evidence of the limitations of public choice theory.99 Paul Rubin
suggests that traditional common law contained an inefficient bias for
special interests, and that environmental legislation has in part
overcome this bias and improved public welfare. 1°° Scrutiny of the
attempted implementation of environmental laws suggests that
special interests have found the judiciary far more amenable to their
pleas than the legislative or executive branches.
Some suggest that environmental regulation reflects rent-seeking
by some special interests at the expense of other businesses and the
98. MASHAW, supra note 90, at 187.
99. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 59, 60 (1992) (noting that collective action theory "appears to have a straightforward
implication for environmental legislation: there should not be any").
100. See Rubin, supra note 64, at 218-19. A similar point is made in Fritz Sollner, The
Role of Common Law in Environmental Policy, 80 PUB. CHOICE 69 (1994).
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market generally. 10' While there are persuasive examples of
individual environmental regulations that are explicable by special
interest rent-seeking, the public choice theory cannot explain the vast
bulk of such regulation. The broad costs of regulation are too great
and its negative effects on company value too profound to make
environmental rules appear pro-business.'02 Corporate interests have
consistently fought for less environmental regulation, before the
legislature, at the agencies, and in the courts.
Special interest litigation in environmental law is primarily
directed at blocking public-regarding legislation or administrative
action. But interests have been able to use the courts affirmatively to
create rents. For example, a court compelled the infamous
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) rule under the Clean
Air Act. 03  The consequent rule had the effect of protecting
industrialized eastern states and industries from competition that
might arise in less-polluted regions of the country.1 4
Non-environmental interests have found other ways to use the
courts and environmental law to advance their interests. Unions, for
example, intervene in environmental permitting decisions in order to
smooth the way for unionized projects and deny permits to
nonunionized companies. 05 The National Environmental Policy Act
is notorious for special interest abuse. The Act's extensive
procedural commands can be used by anyone interested in frustrating
or delaying a major government action. 0 6 Ranches and irrigation
101. See discussion in Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and
Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280,281 (1990).
102. See iL at 308-11.
103. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), affd sub nom., Fri
v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
104. See Michael S. Greve, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 11 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith Jr. eds., 1992)
(explaining how the PSD program "amounted to an enormous wealth transfer from small,
nonunionized to large, unionized firms and from the Sun Belt to the Rust Belt").
105. See Herbert R. Northrup & Augustus T. White, Construction Union Use of
Environmental Regulation To Win Jobs: Cases, Impact, and Legal Challenges, 19 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 55,61-62 (1995).
106. See Susannah T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA
Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929, 972 (1993) (describing "sandbagging" use of NEPA to
interfere with projects); R. Timothy McCrum, NEPA Litigation Affecting Federal Mineral
Leasing and Development, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 58 (1986) (discussing abuse of
NEPA by special interest groups); Roger Nober, Federal Highways and Environmental
Litigation: Toward a Theory of Public Choice and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 229, 250-57 (1990) (describing how NEPA gives various special interest groups
a virtual veto over highway construction); Eugene Bardach & Lucian Pugliaresi, The
Environmental Impact Statement vs. The Real World, 49 PUB. INTEREST 22, 24 (1979)
(describing how special interest groups use NEPA as an "instrument of legal and political
warfare"). For example, a company who lost a contract for helium used NEPA as a tool
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districts have used Endangered Species Act litigation to limit efforts
to protect endangered species. 1°7 CERCLA is commonly employed
in disputes among private companies. 10 8
While the above examples involve factional action by businesses
or unions, even litigation by environmental groups may often be
considered to be on behalf of a special interest rather than the general
public. Litigation may be used as an aid to fundraising efforts. 1°9
Litigation may directly raise funds through attorneys fee awards."0
Some groups have brought citizen suits for law violations and then
settled the actions in exchange for a payment to such a group."'
Within the field of environmental law, judicial action appears only to
exacerbate any political tendencies to favor special interests.
(2) Deregulation
Deregulation typically takes the form of eliminating regulatory
controls on free enterprise, such as price controls, quality
requirements, or entry barriers. Under the traditional conservative
public choice position, deregulation is presumed a beneficial thing, as
the eliminated regulation reflects rent-seeking special interest
deals." 2  Under a more progressive public choice position,
deregulation may conceivably be positive or negative in effect." 3
Even under this theory, economic deregulation is presumptively
to recover the business. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir.
1971).
107. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
108. See generally Jose R. Allen & Karen L. Peterson, Private Party Litigation Under
Superfund: Claims for Cost Recovery and Contribution, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
663 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 23, 1997); Jane E. Lein & Kevin M. Ward, Private
Party Response Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10322 (1991).
109. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311,334.
110. The Natural Resources Defense Council, for example, received over $600,000 in
legal fees in 1987. See JONATHON ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS
45 (1995).
111. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok- The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 195 (1997) ("A portion of
settlement awards and attorney fee awards from citizen suits are typically returned to
environmental interest groups, which then use these resources to fund additional
litigation, scientific and policy research, lobbying, and education.").
112. See Kahn, supra note 101, at 288-91(describing conventional public choice view of
deregulation); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV.
505, 513-15 (1985) (discussing economic argument for courts giving greater deference to
deregulatory action).
113. See Hovenkamp, supra note 90, at 2218-19 (observing that "public choice standing
alone nevertheless takes an essentially 'neutral' position on the appropriateness of
regulation as a general matter").
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positive.114 Under no conception of public choice theory, though, is
deregulation presumptively dubious. 15 Yet this position is precisely
that taken by the courts applying administrative law, thereby enabling
special interests to protect special deals from subsequent judicial
rethinking and executive branch reversal in the general public
interest.
Deregulation almost by definition requires a reversal of prior
agency policy. Any change in agency policy tends to be given close
scrutiny by the courts.116 The Supreme Court has held that an agency
"rescinding a rule" has analytical obligations that go "beyond" those
initially required in promulgating the rule.117 Thus, deregulatory
efforts may merit a particularly hard look on judicial review, easing
the path of special interests who seek to protect their rent-seeking
statutory bargains.
The heightened judicial review of deregulation has been used in
a series of cases to frustrate deregulatory efforts."18 A study of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's efforts to deregulate
demonstrate how the Commission was frustrated by the courts'
particularly strict review.119 Many of the Reagan Administration
deregulatory efforts were frustrated by judicial review.120 Courts have
proved almost uniformly suspicious of deregulation, which has limited
its effects. 121
114. See John Birritt McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for
Electricity's Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 931-32 (1998) (noting that
deregulation is contrary to theory of interest group politics).
115. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1071 (1997) (suggesting that deregulation is a "normative position generally
associated with public choice theory").
116. See Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules
and Regulations, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1187 (1997).
117. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42 (1983).
118. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (enabling union to
vacate Labor Department deregulation); Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794
F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (successful corporate challenge to FCC rule rescission);
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(upholding union challenge to deregulation); Public Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d 444 (1988)
(striking down NHTSA efforts to deregulate tire treadwear standards); Office of Com. Of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (striking down portion of
FCC rules that would limit burden on radio licensees to maintain programming logs).
119. See Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial
Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 114,116-28 (1998).
120. See Larry W. Thomas, et al., The Courts and Agency Deregulation: Limitations on
the Presidential Control of Regulatory Policy, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 27, 31-40 (1987)
(discussing how judicial review at least partially undermined six major deregulation
efforts); Gregory Bradshaw Foote, Judicial Review of Rescission of Rules: A 'Passive
Restraint' on Deregulation, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 252 (1984).
121. See Garland, supra note 112, at 540 (noting that courts overturned a "substantial
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The existence of economic deregulation and elimination of
federal agencies is testimony to the ability of the elected branches to
act in the public interest. 22 Economic regulation is often cited as
evidence of the influence of special interests over government policy.
The elimination of such regulation is, correspondingly, evidence of
the ability of the elected branches to overcome such special interest
pressures. Courts, however, have provided the special interests with a
sometimes effective constraint on public-minded deregulatory action.
(3) Legislative Procedural Reform
Legislatures have intermittently taken steps to limit special
interest influence in the legislative process, through actions such as
campaign financing reforms. While the adequacy of these steps might
surely be questioned, they represent at least small steps toward
reform, presumably at the behest of frustrated voters. Campaign
contributions have been regulated, the outside income of legislators
has been limited, many gifts have been banned, and terms have even
been limited. The presence of these restrictions is testimony to the at
least occasional ability of ideology and public opinion to overcome
interest group pressures.
Yet courts have consistently struck down efforts to reform
legislative procedure and reduce the influence of special interests. In
Buckley, the Supreme Court famously struck down federal statutory
limitations on expenditures of political action committees.123 The
Court likewise struck down a Massachusetts law that would prohibit
corporate expenditures aimed at influencing plebiscites. 2 4 The Court
also eliminated the ability to term limit federal representatives,
entrenching existing legislators and enhancing their ability to demand
tribute.'2 In general, "on those rare occasions when legislatures have
attempted to curb special interests, the Supreme Court has...
invalidated on first amendment grounds limitations on PAC
campaign expenditures."' 26 The Court has likewise commonly struck
down Federal Election Commission efforts to enforce those laws that
survived facial attack in the courts. 27 Most recently the Court has cut
percentage" of deregulatory decisions, save for those of the FCC).
122. See Kahn, supra note 101, at 286. Kahn notes that interest groups generally
favored deregulation of social regulation and opposed deregulation of economic
regulation, yet the deregulation that occurred was primarily economic. See id.
123. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
124. See First National Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
125. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
126. Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 912.
127. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (ruling that political party expenditure limits cannot be
applied to party's independent expenditures); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
[Vol. 50
back significantly on the impact that anti-bribery laws will have on
special interests providing gratuities to federal officers.128
Legislatures have not exactly been eager to reform the political
process, just as public choice theory suggests. Many campaign reform
bills have been obstructed in Congress. However, public political
pressure at least occasionally forces the enactment of campaign
reform legislation. The courts have not proved effective in forcing
legislative procedural reform, but they have proved powerful in
restricting those reforms that survive the political process. Judicial
review is thus a one way ratchet that serves only to frustrate reform
and shelter interest group influence with the political branches.
If the above case studies are insufficiently persuasive, rigorous
statistical analysis demonstrates the disadvantages of judicial review
and show the effect of special interests on the courts. One study
found that the Supreme Court was more likely to grant certiorari
when review was sought by interest groups participating as amicus
curiae.1 29  Indeed, "commercial interests ... dominated pressure
group activity in the Court," participating more than all other non-
governmental interests combined. 130 A study of challenges to EPA
hazardous waste rules issued from 1988-1990 found that 91% of the
groups participating in litigation were corporations or trade
associations.' 3'
The influence of factions in court is confirmed by a recent study
of Court of Federal Claims decisions on international trade policy.132
The author hypothesized that "a concentrated industry is expected to
possess the ability to exert meaningful influence on court decisions
through superior case selection, preparation, and legal advocacy. '"133
After reviewing over one hundred decisions and running statistical
analysis, the hypothesis was confirmed: "companies that represent a
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (finding that application of statute precluding
nonprofit corporation from influencing elections was unconstitutional); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (striking
down provision of law criminalizing political action committee expenditures of more than
$1,000 to candidates receiving public financing).
128. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, No. 98-131, 1999 WL 241704
(U.S. April 27, 1999).
129. See Gregory Caldeira & A. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988).
130. Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRrICAL ASSESSMENT 354 (John D. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
131. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in
the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & SOC'Y. REv. 735,742-43 (1996).
132. Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts of Appeals' Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the
Politics of Protectionism, 50 POL. RES. Q. 851 (1997).
133. Id. at 861.
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highly concentrated industry are far better able to convince Federal
Circuit judges to rule in favor of protection than are those from
industries that are less concentrated and therefore politically
weak."134
A particularly relevant empirical study examined the actions of
governors and compared those potentially up for reelection with
those precluded from reelection by term limits. 135 It specifically
considered the exercise of the governor's veto power over special
interest legislation, analogized to the role of review by an
independent judiciary.136 The fundamental conclusion of the study
was that "where the governor is less independent in the sense of
having to stand for reelection (unlimited succession rights), the less
likely he is to use the veto to uphold special-interest contracts."'137 In
short, political accountability counteracts special interest bargains,
while political independence furthers them.
If the above evidence is unpersuasive, the sockdolager should be
an examination of the behavior of interest groups bargaining for
judicial review provisions before the Congress. If the conventional
theory were correct, one would expect such groups to disfavor judicial
review, which could undo their interest group bargain with the
legislature and their lobbying before the agencies. Yet experience is
precisely the opposite; interest groups have consistently favored "an
active, easily triggered role for the courts in reviewing agency
decisions.' 1 38 The Administrative Procedure Act itself is the product
of industry groups trying to resist bearing the costs of regulation.139
Charles Shipan's thorough review of communications legislation
demonstrates how affected parties fought over judicial review
provisions in order to enhance their substantive positions.14 Trade
associations recently have urged the adoption of strong judicial
review provisions in regulatory reform legislation.141 While the
134. Id. at 869.
135. See W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-
Group Theory of Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979).
136. See id. at 557-60.
137. Id. at 564 -65. Regression results also verify this theory. See id.
138. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT
GOVERN? 276 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
139. See George B. Shepard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 (1992).
140. See CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: INTEREST GROUPS,
CONGRESS AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 79-95 (1997); Charles R. Shipan, Interest
Groups, Judicial Review, and the Origins of Broadcast Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 549
(1997).
141. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State,
48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 271 (1996).
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drafting of these judicial review provisions is an illustration of special
interest influence on legislatures, it reflects a belief that judicial
review can expand factional interest beyond even that level
achievable through legislative action alone.
Conclusion
Public choice theory logically calls for less, not more judicial
involvement in law-making. Some claim, perhaps accurately, that
there is far more gross special interest influence on legislatures and
the executive than in courts. But this is the issue to examine when
evaluating the judicial role. To assess the net benefits requires
consideration of the circumstances when the judiciary combats
improper special interest influence, as weighed against the
circumstances when the judiciary furthers such influence.
This article has catalogued reasons and evidence why the
judiciary will often create rulings favoring special interests and
obstruct the legitimate public-regarding actions taken by the other
branches. Courts introduce considerable special interest benefit into
the legal system. To justify judicial involvement would require at
least comparable evidence of the courts' willingness and ability to
combat laws and executive action taken at the behest of special
interests.
The analysis of this and other articles gives reasons to doubt the
special interest fighting capabilities of the courts. An excellent
illustration of this inability can be found in City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc.42 Confronting a new entrant in the
outdoor advertising market, a local monopolist conspired with city
government to enact a zoning ordinance restricting new billboard
construction. One can scarcely imagine a better example of special
interest influence and improper government action from the public
choice perspective. The new entrant brought an antitrust action and
won a jury verdict against the city's actions. After the district court
overruled the jury, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court,
applying a conspiracy exception to the state action antitrust law
defense. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, essentially
ruling that the Fourth Circuit had been too activist in applying such
an exception and protecting the special interest deal of the local
monopolist. Institutionally, the judiciary is not generally capable of
correcting special interest group influence on government.
My indictment of the courts has relatively little to do with the
incentives or shortcomings of judges, rather it has everything to do
with the structure of the litigation process. Public choice analysis has
142. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
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focused too often upon the individual decision maker and not on the
structure in which she operates. Considering the institution is critical.
The problematic structure of public law litigation is largely
unavoidable, making greater judicial involvement inherently
undesirable. Expanded judicial involvement is especially
inappropriate in the field of administrative law.
